

## 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIST

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE  
STRATEGIST**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The goal of this paper is to generate dialogue within the intelligence planning community regarding strategic Human Intelligence (HUMINT) design. HUMINT operations have the potential to be an operational, if not strategic center of gravity to defeat the United States' most challenging opponent, the insurgency. There is no doubt that America provides numerous examples of superior field craft application and tactical success. Nearly every day successful HUMINT operations occur, but there is likely a reason the nation has not successfully capitalized on these opportunities to strategically defeat the enemy networks. One contributing factor may be weaknesses in HUMINT doctrine which in turn contributes to uncoordinated efforts. Another root may be a focus too far below the operational and strategic level of war. This document examines some historical theories that suggest new considerations for the 21<sup>st</sup> century human intelligence strategists to address these deficiencies. Additionally, it recommends a preemptive policy that allows the engagement of insurgencies prior to their maturation while simultaneously maintaining the high intensity upper hand.



## 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIST

The United States is faced with a host of enemies, many of whom cannot feasibly defeat the nation in traditional warfare and are therefore turning to unconventional and asymmetric options to attack American strategic vulnerabilities. These options are heavily dependent upon human networking and low-level preparatory actions that may extend through all phases of conflict. The United States' problem, therefore, is to determine what measures can be taken to detect, and to either disrupt or defeat these adversaries. Some strategic solutions may include manipulating insurgencies or strategically-directed human network operations to cause them to choose venues more susceptible to United States' targeting and the American way of war. Informed and deliberate strategic human network targeting may play the key role in this type of operation and is the main focus of this paper. This document examines some historical theories that suggest new considerations for the 21<sup>st</sup> century human intelligence strategists to address current gaps in HUMINT doctrine and strategic design. A discussion follows on the nature of insurgency. This knowledge, combined with principles of warfare, results in an operational human intelligence design which will provide strategic advantages to the United States' Armed Forces.

The paper introduces founding policies upon which to anchor the human-based strategy. This is followed by lessons derived from the principles of war as suggested by the makers of modern strategy. These principles include understanding intent, and tailoring one's force to gain access to the enemy's key decisions as they are formulated and executed. The discussion continues with types of assets, or humans, categorized



as dwell and mobile. A historic reference from the Philippine War of 1899-1902 provides reinforcement to the value of combining these two types of assets when engaging an insurgency. The discussion continues with the concept that one may be able to entice an enemy, in this case a system in the form of an insurgency, to a level of conflict, technology dependency, or location of one's choosing. Chinese expansion and attempts to control critical African resources serves as a backdrop to explore this concept further. The paper then concludes with critical issues that policy makers and the human strategist should consider when committing to long term human intelligence strategies. These include ethical decisions, required shifts in strategic analytic capability, packaging intelligence for senior leaders, and an understanding of the never-ending cyclic phenomena of war.

### The Founding Policy

The broad strategy should begin with a policy reinforcing the United States' core strengths, which include technological savvy, mobility, and power projection among other aspects. Many nations acknowledge that the United States possesses the dominant high intensity and enabled armed force on the planet. Generally, it is going to succeed in besting its opponents, that is, unless engaged asymmetrically. Then, the United States seems to struggle. With regard to the American perspective then, investing in means and ways to deny or disable the asymmetric nature of some opponents seems to be in its interest. Of these asymmetric threats, the organized insurgency is the nation's least favorable opposing force. The United States should adopt, then, a preemptive policy that allows the engagement of insurgencies prior to their maturation while simultaneously maintaining the high intensity upper hand. If

blocking the rise of an insurgency is not feasible, then the United States should design operations that drive the insurgencies toward more technologically exploitable venues. This requires steadfast investment in penetrating hard targets to influence enemies' decisions to acquire and use technology. Finally, the United States should coordinate and shape both the asymmetric and traditional military strategic engagements to occur at the time and place of its choosing. This means that American leadership must establish a policy of significant and enduring preemptive human intelligence operations in lands where this nation's interests are not currently threatened.

### The Broad Strategy

One should build the strategy upon a sound foundation of principles of war suggested by the makers of modern strategy. There are some standouts to emulate such as Moltke, Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu, and Frederick the Great. Of note, these strategists emphasized the individual as a target. Additionally, one should study the doctrine of Mao, because his works are widely mimicked in current insurgencies. Also, he is a touchstone for one of America's potential future peer competitors, China. The next few pages propose some of the key lessons that the human intelligence strategists can draw from these historical figures.

### Intent Before Engagement

Ultimately warfare is personal, hand to hand on the battlefield or mind against mind on the strategic planning table. If one can understand and target the mind of his enemy, one will establish the conditions for the success of his forces in battle no matter the echelon. Frederick the Great advised his generals, "If we were acquainted beforehand with the intentions of the enemy, we should always be more than a match

for him even with an inferior force.”<sup>1</sup> The first element of his statement is the understanding that knowledge of intent should precede engagement. Though it is easier for an adversary to hide strategic intent initially due to limited distribution of concepts to a small group of trusted people, eventually this circle opens up. Resources or capabilities to put the strategic intent into action must eventually be developed. The enemy will reveal his intent through discussion, correspondence, or other activity prior to execution. This vulnerability is predictable. It is critical that the strategic planner facilitate the emplacement of collection platforms to observe these vulnerable human activities long before armed forces are employed.

### Tailored Forces

The second element to address is that an opposing armed force, given access to an enemy’s intentions, can defeat a superior armed force with a numerically inferior one. This is a thought that appeals to policy makers who must face the realities of limited resources, national morale, and political culture. One need not employ large armies if smaller, tailored strategic human intelligence forces can shape the enemies operational choices. The human intelligence force can persuade or entice enemy leaders, maneuver elements, or other decisive forces to an objective that the friendly force can then engage directly.

Humans capable of gaining placement and access within the influence circle of critical leaders or enemy elements are finite. The views of the various collectors must be considered a system that, working in synchronization, refine the commander’s focus on specific enemy leaders, knowledge of strategic intent, critical vulnerabilities, or routes of movement for instance. Their interdependent reporting and influence can become an

operational center of gravity. Patience and forethought are critical to this process. The aim of this friendly network is to facilitate a military operation which in turn brings about potential strategic opportunities. The HUMINT team is “tailor made”, just as the maneuver forces they may queue for action. One may nullify the network’s effectiveness if one diverts its focus toward other reporting requirements as surely as if the enemy successfully attacked the operational center of gravity itself.

### Choosing the Battlefield

When possible, one should choose the location or region where the advantages of the enemy’s familiarity with his own culture can be reduced. This reduces the enemy’s ability to move undetected and increases predictability for counterinsurgency success. One may engage an approaching force where they are, or one may entice the enemy to an area or region of one’s choosing. This “enticing” is the intent, or thinking realm precursor, to encirclement. Mao Tse-Tung described physical encirclements and said, “if one considers all the guerilla base areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces.”<sup>2</sup> If one considers properly established human intelligence source networks together, and their relationship to the enemy’s “view” or access to strategic objectives, one can see the parallel of encircling his forces.

### The Nature of Maoist Insurgency

Mao states that, “the people are the water in which the guerrilla fish could swim.”<sup>3</sup> This implies that the base of the insurgency depends upon the support provided by the people. Students of Maoist doctrine know that eventually there is a tipping point where the secretive small group activities that begin an insurgency eventually transition to a

mobile warfare stage. As this develops, the insurgency often grows to resemble a hierarchical military with all the vulnerabilities of command and control that come with it. Prior to the tipping point, the enemy will acquire and move arms, train in explosives, and shift large amounts of money for instance. The opposing force should have agents in place to serve as insurgent bait. These agents could be arms dealers or possess specific military skills such as sniper or bomb maker. The intent is to draw the enemy toward strategically placed, critical vendors of warfare who are under one's own control. Edward Luttwak mentioned that, "it is only in war that a bad road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be less strongly defended or even left unguarded by the enemy."<sup>4</sup> If one wants to catch bad people, one must work with bad people. This may challenge some American cultural values and norms and may actually require policy changes. The pre-positioned assets may have to kill some people or damage some infrastructure before their bona fides opens their access to the strategic human target. The ethical issues associated with this concept will be addressed later in the paper.

### Strategist Options

Ideally, a strategist with a long view of the ebb and flow of war should take advantage of available time and direct the pre-positioning of both human enabling devices and human assets for future action, even if they are currently located in undisputed territory. The strategist has several options here. First, design the maintenance of a wide base of native people who do nothing more than live their lives and serve as bait for the first nibbles of an insurgent request for support. One can designate these as dwell or stationary tactical agents. Second, should one miss the

initial testing of the line, the strategist could ensure that assets with specialty capabilities exist to tempt the adversary leaders as the insurgency grows. Third, create smaller, mobile source networks that can shadow enemy cells as they travel through dwell asset areas of responsibility. Finally, enable all of the above with the technological enablers that are the lifeblood of the American way of war.

### Dwell Assets

The dwell assets are especially important if one cannot observe the enemy directly. Sun Tzu developed strategies void of the technologic solutions available to planners today. He relied heavily upon secret agents whom he classified as, “native, inside, doubled, expendable, and living.”<sup>5</sup> Clearly, the intent was to use multiple human-based “avenues of approach” to gain the information on the enemy’s strategic intent. When one ties together the various threads of information from these multiple sources one can increase the likelihood that the derived understanding is reliable. Sun Tzu had the benefit of planning and conducting his spy operations within a cultural environment shared by his adversaries. He generally used them in a fixed manner as introduced above, placing multiple agents around specific hubs to report changes in activities, for instance. His agents could often directly observe and converse with the target of their choice. When the direct human line of sight, to borrow from weapon terminology, is obscured by culture or operational security practices, the strategist must adapt. Again, timeliness can assist in this endeavor. Sometimes the strategist is challenged to insert a human into a place where they can actually serve the purpose of dwell observation. These cases are often assisted by technical enablers. The systems of human and technical means are mutually supporting.

### Dwell Asset Lead Time

The human intelligence strategist's ultimate goal is to observe with direct, not indirect sources. With this direct observation, they could set the conditions for insurgency manipulation for future hand off to the armed forces engagement. This quality of asset requires a long lead time to emplace and develop. The controlled networks must be established and nurtured as part of the communities in which they are embedded. To put this timeline in perspective, these pre-war activities can occur years before armies are mobilized. It is simple to see that these human-based activities will be moving and setting while nations are likely still heavily committed to diplomatic, economic, informational discourse. The intelligence strategist should maintain focus on the potential future operational or strategic battle that the dwell assets may enable or shape. Precautions to protect the assets from mission diversion should be a critical component of the overall collection network design.

### Motive

Once the strategist determines his objective and selects his potential human asset, he needs to determine the motive for this asset. If the sole motivation for the human source is money, the reliability of the person is questionable. Sun Tzu, regarding money as a motivation stated, "Among agents there are some whose only interest is acquiring wealth without obtaining the true situation of the enemy, for such a case I must be deep and subtle."<sup>6</sup> The strategist should direct the selection and fostering of ideologically or emotionally-based sympathizers who, with proper mentorship and guidance, willingly insert themselves into the lion's den. In classic nation and nation-state frameworks this should be fairly simple. Selectively acquire proxies from the

potential adversary's military and civilian advisory rank and file who possess the potential to rise to positions of power and influence. The real challenge is stoking the motivation without exposure over the long term. The organizational behavior expectancy model for human behavior can apply readily to this situation. Strategically, seeding a country with assets in uncontested territory well ahead of an insurgency should be even easier. This is because few people would be looking for agents opposing a third country, or insurgency, at that point in the operation.

### Mobile Assets

When one is targeting a human or system of humans who are mobile and obscured from technical collection, then the strategist should employ similar human assets or sets of humans who are as mobile as the target. One can then reinforce dwell asset collection and reporting with a manageable number of mobile collectors who can be maneuvered discreetly from one area to another based upon stationary agent and technical platform queuing.

### Combined Operations

There are some fairly recent examples of this combined dwell-mobile approach succeeding with an already active insurgency. The Philippine War of 1899-1902, for instance, can provide some confirmation to the theories addressed here. Through happenstance, mostly, American forces eventually initiated a combination of fixed, local human source networks and mobile, reinforcing reconnaissance operations. The fixed networks took advantage of indigenous leaders as well as peasant farmers. Most of this effort resulted in tactical, "atmospheric" information. This information in its raw form was still available for district and region analysis. These collection and reporting actions did



not require duplication of effort. Rather, they provided the opportunity for cross queued intelligence maneuvers. These cross queued operations built upon the access provided by indigenous people across a broad spectrum of society. According to Brian Linn, a Philippine War expert, once a municipality was convinced to take defensive action against the insurgents, “Its very survival was tied to an American victory and increasingly such loyal, or americanista, towns furnished porters, guides, and armed auxiliaries to hunt down guerrillas.”<sup>7</sup> The “controlled” towns also provided invaluable sources that were able to detect the arrival of guerillas and track and report their activities locally. In addition, mobile forces maintained overwatch of the enemy as they moved onward.

#### Future Application

It is sometimes useful to utilize a theoretical scenario based upon potential courses of action rather than historical ones. At the very least, such an endeavor helps keep intelligence and operations discussions in the open domain where more people can participate. China presents itself as a possible future peer competitor against whom to test the intelligence observations addressed to this point. The next few pages explore the strategic human intelligence observations framed within a China scenario.

China’s current resource oriented expansion in Africa makes that continent a potential environment within which to initiate a systemic human intelligence strategy. This scenario is supported by a broad review of China through the dimensions of the cultural framework bounded by national identity, political culture, regional identity, power structure, strategic culture, and globalization. China determined, after observing the 1991 Gulf War, that its forces were much weaker than those of the United States. Since

the Chinese do not want to be in an inferior position, they placed greater urgency on their modernization efforts to better their standing. "For Chinese defense planners that war reconfirmed the validity of the direction of China's military modernization...from a reliance on large mass forces and toward professionalism and the substitution of technology for manpower."<sup>8</sup> The recent Iraq and Afghanistan operations may be modifying the perceived imbalance of the two nations' military forces. This may lead to a more aggressive strategic culture over the coming years and this may express itself in challenging behavior toward the United States. As a result of this new view, senior American leaders should expect more demonstrations of power, perhaps initially toward the disputed territories not vehemently protected by United States Policy Statements. Increasingly assertive rhetoric and provocations toward Taiwan will indicate that the Chinese believe that the balance of power is shifting to their side.

China is not completely ruled by its cultural foundations and overriding concern to secure Taiwan. Natural fallout of economic reforms within China is opening key communications means to the outside world. This widening view caused China to see their goals in light of a global perspective. They must look beyond their immediate borders and project power to increase their influence abroad and to gain access to future resource pools. This projection topic leads us to the effect of globalization on the overall cultural framework. Polling data indicates that, "Globalization is increasingly viewed by China as a force that can erode state sovereignty. Thus, increasingly comprehensive national strength is necessary to protect state sovereignty and pursue national interests."<sup>9</sup> China understands the importance of quickly securing influence in areas such as Africa and the resource rich areas that are being contested by great

powers. Policy makers should expect China to maximize low technology means to secure these areas in the near term. They do not wish to undermine the pace of their internal military and economic reforms by diverting large resources to the projection forces. This may lead to solutions such as literally exporting Chinese people as a strategic anchor that can be exploited long term. Michael Diebert, a Paris based trade reporter stated that, "to help meet its demand for fuel, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports in 2006. Critics charge that profits from these sales have enabled the Khartoum government to buy weapons with which to continue its military operations -- both directly and by proxy -- in the nation's Darfur region."<sup>10</sup> China dispatched energy industry technicians into Angola as far back as 1960, and continues this practice today as evidenced by their aggressive expansion in the Gulf of Guinea region beginning in 2005.<sup>11</sup> China may go as far as establishing insurgent-like networks available to undermine other nations' technologically superior armed forces should they feel their access to critical resources is threatened. Following this line of reasoning, it is possible to project a theoretical outcome; the friction between China and the United States for dominance over strategic resources resulting in movement toward military action on the African continent.

#### Scenario Based Human Intelligence Strategy

To counter Chinese dominance of the critical resources the United States could emplace a complex human source network composed of dwell and mobile collectors in Africa to identify Chinese inflow and positioning in relation to their ability to control those assets. Dwell assets would ideally be situated in proximity to fixed oil production and shipping facilities as well as ports of entry and egress. Secondary collection zones could

include strategic dam projects. Initially these stationary networks could be established in Sudan, and the Gulf of Guinea region. Other obvious observation networks include the industries themselves, such as the outlying corporate management offices serving PetroChina. Mobile assets could be fostered in the labor pool, or in the displaced populations of the Sudan and Darfur regions. Many non-governmental agencies also have the ability to transit vast areas without standing out and could provide an additional venue for source network mobility. Diplomatic engagement from traditional Department of State and economic activities could then place increasing demands upon China's target countries potentially forcing China to undermine these pressures via insurgent tactics. Banking firms and service industry assets could build situational awareness that supports detection of Chinese movement into an area. Dwell asset observations could trigger technical or mobile asset activation. Additionally, they could indicate where an asset with particular talents would attract Chinese attention, and potentially enable recruitment into Chinese planning cells. Meanwhile, American Armed Forces could slowly expand their influence and control of key nodes within the context of stability and support activities. Assets who rise to positions of influence within the Chinese resource dominance activities could attempt to block efforts to counter United States' interests. Alternatively, they could encourage active insurgent development to a point where the Chinese strategic leaders choose to engage the United States military. This engagement would likely grow in the form of the expected insurgency given the Chinese historical experience and inability to project its army. The United States could then strategically manipulate perceived vulnerabilities from the Chinese perspective and

entice them into an engagement at a time, place, and level of complexity of its own choosing.

### Risk - Ethical Considerations

This is an appropriate point to touch upon some legal and ethical constraints of the proposed approach. Whether conducting HUMINT shaping operations to disable, dislocate, or disrupt a growing insurgency or engaging one already underway, one should take the time to evaluate some risks associated with the conduct of the war, or *jus in bello*. The nation may need to adjust its current behaviors for the borderless, non-state engagements and this may challenge American cultural norms and values. *Jus in bello* has traditionally been about the methods of fighting defined by proportionality and discrimination. At what point in the growing awareness of an enemy's intent can one delay acting upon a lesser threat that will result in the deaths of innocent people? If one determines that the only way a human asset has to gain membership to a previously closed inner circle of strategic enemy council members is to shoot and kill an innocent civilian, does one approve that? What if one knows that by gaining this access the agent will likely be able to stop the killing of thousands of Americans the following month? The Just War theories do not appear efficient to cover these contingencies. Senior government leaders currently accept deliberately targeting houses that they know have innocents in them in order to achieve strikes on some key objectives. When one's objective is information or access, is the collateral damage of an innocent person distanced from that target acceptable? For example, is an asset under one's control allowed to kill innocent people as a sign of loyalty required for access to an information objective, the inner circle of command group X? Is the rationale for these deaths equal

to those in the targeted house? Eric Patterson suggests a reconceptualized Just War theory that, “articulates a principle of discrimination rather than one of non-combatant immunity.”<sup>12</sup> It is not clear that he considered the situation above. The military strategist should convey these possible courses of action to civilian leadership so that they, who are burdened with the final decision, have time to consider the potential risks and benefits.

### Analysis

Most of the discussion to this point has addressed positioning and maneuvering human assets for the acquisition of information. Intelligence, however, as described by Michael I. Handel, a leading theorist of strategic surprise and deception, “is divided into three distinct levels: acquisition (the collection of information); analysis (its evaluation); and acceptance (the readiness of politicians to make use of intelligence in the formulation of their policies).”<sup>13</sup> Throughout the Cold War years the intelligence infrastructure grew to monitor and collect information about the capabilities of nations. This primarily concerned physical data such as numbers of tanks, artillery, and other armaments. Also, because of the influence of strategic air power theories, a good portion of American intelligence efforts were focused on stationary targets. This is primarily because capabilities were easier to discern than human intent. The effect was two-fold. First, the supporting analytic and communications architecture to aid the capabilities collection were designed to receive and draw conclusions about physical data. Second, an expectation was created among the intelligence community and among many senior leaders that this analytic effort monitored enough indicators and warnings to provide sufficient time to mobilize U.S. forces and respond.

When one seeks information about a specific person or group's intent, one may not have data that triggers indicators and warnings of an attack. With some luck, the human target publishes documents and memoirs that over time allow analysts some means to reveal patterns or indicators of decisionmaking or bias. Alternatively, previously mentioned dwell assets can be interviewed and consulted to provide insight into the primary target's cultural or educational background. To improve one's ability to correctly evaluate data from multiple human assets, modifications to the analytic arm of the intelligence community must occur. The intelligence community must increase its ability to understand opponents cultural, ethical, educational, and other influences. Napoleon used agents extensively in foreign capitals, usually in banks and stores, to obtain information about political climate, commercial relations, and attitudes of his adversaries.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, the strategic planner should direct the recruitment of analytic foundry assets inside the various countries most likely to produce strategic threats. America should invest heavily in educating its analysts in critical reasoning and self awareness to defend against their own biases when attempting to predict the opposing strategic leader's decisions.

### Packaging the Product

Intelligence not properly conveyed to a decisionmaker is useless. Intelligence professionals must analyze their own leaders and determine how they process information and the leader's acceptance criteria. Churchill, for instance, was known for his insatiable demand for intelligence information and particularly for his faith in espionage, a faith sometimes misplaced. Christopher Andrews, who has written extensively on the history of intelligence services, noted that, "Churchill's long

involvement with intelligence went back to his early adventures at the frontiers of the late Victorian Empire.” This included personally escaping from a Boer prison in disguise and conducting reconnaissance on a bicycle.<sup>15</sup> As a senior leader his experience provided an awareness of the potential successes and failures of intelligence. He practiced its application to his advantage at each echelon in which he served.

Clausewitz was the opposite type of leader. He used intelligence, but felt its value limited and fleeting. He described it as unreliable and transient, “a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins.”<sup>16</sup> A review of his writings reveals a man who may have been open to the intelligence architecture supporting the capabilities collection of the Cold War, but very unlikely to support human-targeted collection.

President George Bush was likely heavily influenced by his father’s participation in the CIA and may have seen that agency as the premier source of human intelligence. The mistakes of 9/11 fell heavily upon that agency, however, and the nation may be witnessing an overcorrection on the perceived value and reliability of human sources for long term planning. The United States key leaders are pressured to predict the intent of a Maoist influenced enemy without the benefit of an existing strategic source network.

Most of the current HUMINT effort appears to be focused on pursuing specific, individual targets. There does not appear to be an intent to strategically envelope the system that embodies a potential insurgency. Some military strategists should step away from this close fight and focus on developing a human intelligence plan that is long term and enduring. Then, intelligence professionals must confront the biases of their current or near term leaders to ensure the value of this commitment is not discounted. The means of gaining leaders’ acceptance of the validity and reliability of



the acquisition and analysis of strategic enemy intent should be as well planned as the insertion and long term support of the nation's agents.

### Not Over When It Is Over

An important aspect to this long term effort is to plan for the end of the war, or just post bellum. William Flavin drew upon the writings of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart among others when he concluded, "Before any conflict starts, the intelligence community must include factors affecting the termination and post-conflict operational area in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)."<sup>17</sup> This means several things to the strategic human intelligence planner. First, one must assume that even given a regime change, one must ensure assets are secured and positioned who can eventually provide insight into the new leadership's perceptions and intent. One has to maintain a long term, lifetime vision for this operation to work. Initially, one's assets must provide leadership a trigger that indicates when the enemy they are facing or the powers they are supporting are willing to terminate and establish new conditions. Second, one must protect the identities of the "fish" who contribute to the initial fight because eventually they may be used again. In a global guerilla-type war, one should assume the mobile enemy one is confronting will continue to swim through the region long after the escalation in one territory dies down. The strategist must continue to watch the waters and keep his bait on the line. Third, one must plan for the transition of some control of strategic sources no longer providing viable military targeting to civilian agencies that can use them for other objectives.

### Conclusion

Complex and enduring human intelligence operations are critical to providing the United States strategic advantages over its enemies. To that end, this paper raised awareness of the broad historical lessons that can be applied by the intelligence strategist today. It briefly touched upon some strategies that should be considered to plan for the full cycle of pre-conflict to post-conflict operations. Details of strategies can be explored at length; however, it is more important that the strategist first come to terms with the broad implications of 21st century warfare. The United States must invest in a lifetime approach to acquire, analyze, and ensure acceptance of strategic human intelligence targeting and of the dual mobile-dwell asset strategy. The government needs to wrestle with the moral and ethical issues that come with this process. Additionally, one should consider that war may be the dominant state of behavior for the world's actors. Diplomacy may, in reality, be an extension of war and not the other way around. Anticipating this escalation cycle, perhaps military commanders should be provided sufficient human intelligence resources along with the less constrained authority to conduct operations where they identify growing national interests. Leaders should understand that the global nature of some current wars are overlaid upon traditional state on state conflicts and must be fought simultaneously. This calls for a significant investment in training, monitoring, and mentoring of assets that may never be used in one's lifetime. There is evidence of insurgencies expanding into the borderless corporate and informational environments and this requires adapting the United State's legal frameworks and alliances as well. Warfare is evolving, and although one can draw upon the lessons of the past, the opportunity to seize the enabling human intelligence initiative must be taken now to enhance America's long term security.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Frederick the Great, "Military Instructions, Article XII"; available from <http://www.pattonhq.com/militaryworks/frederick.html>; Internet; accessed 13 September 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War," in *Selected Military Writings*, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 175.

<sup>3</sup> Charles Townshend, "Peoples War," in *Theory of War and Strategy, Volume 3 – Readings*, Department of National Security and Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007), 237

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